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Tomber Juste
Nicholas Strobbe
+ This name no longer names Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard. A
name which can no longer speak in our idiom, an absolutely
different name, a diffirend. How to remember the unpresentable?
What time belongs to this temporality; this passing that
has been, and that goes under to his name (with which we are
out of touch, and which left in the historicity ofa touch, leaving
touch, dis-sensus)? A singular name, then, that called to the post
modo, which left itselfat inception, and even as its inception. Of
what time are we speaking, with respect, to this historicity that
touches us here? What is the time ofthe touch? But time is given
in the failure (and the failure of the presentation, for these are
not one) of the end, which would mean that not only is there
not a self-identical end, but that the end would be multiple and
differentiated (and indicate, too, a certain incompossibiJity of
lacl~ that would be generative and not a simple nothing, that
'trick facility of an empty Alterity' or Zero in that heterogenous
and 'evil book' of his, Libidinal Economy - if it is a book - and
which, moreover, would not be reduced to a critique). How is
time given in this failure of the end? To touch on the end in
other words - but does not touch reach its end? Is death the
absence of touch, is this what would touch us?
. But death touches us (it is not that one doesn't experience
death, or that it is not significant for us). Death marks an absence
of the mediation of touch. The dead are untouchable, and yet
death has the capacity of touching us terribly. In death, we cannot
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touch the other, the other is unpresent(able), so that this touch
reaches out to its abyss and is experienced there in the suspension
of the other. Death is where I reach out and touch in vertigo the
suspension of the other.
:t: If one cannot touch the touch, if one cannot stop this
suspension, make it present, it is because this touch and its
suspension is time. It is a time whose denomination would be
the discontinuous present (that is, not the simple present '1 think'
or the continuous present '1 am thinking'), Time, the present,
the now, is already a delay - so that we can not say that there is
any touch without historicity and time. Touch, like time, in
suspension (ercoy), is unendurable. Here the limit or the littoral
touches the literal, the object ofdiscourse touches the edge ofits
presentness there (ly), but always already in its delay, in a touch
that always overreaches itself, too late (tard), in which it is not
absolutely recognised. Here, nothing can touch the suspension
(tomber) oftouch (this suspension is kept open). It is untouched,
and this suspension is just now (juste).
*For-gotten.
Be loved.
+This space in which one will have been finally converted
(in the night: April 20-21) .Though remembering here is without
recollection, here in the Antipodes, in the seas of another shore
and in an other archipelago, and ofwhat remains toutjuste. This
archipelago which, for Lyotard (who is concerned with the
political and the just, iesjustes, and gets the irreducible necessity
of judging just right, hitting the nail on the head, as one might
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say, tomberjuste), names the incommensurability ofheterogenous
genres of discourse, an incommensurability in which there is no
determined object with respect to the faculty ofjudgement (where
the faeul ty of judgement marks a passage in the seas between
these islands). The island is a narrative and a genre, but the passage
between the borders ofthe islands (pagus) is without an end or a
final Idea, a littoral zone ofheterogeneous differentiation between
genres which allows differends to arise. (Did we not see this, adrift
- whether the sea has an edge? Always to approach it, to approach
its edge dejuste, its limit, as this informe ... but the sea withdraws
its edge, it is the withdrawal of the edge. It does not tear, it is
pure tear.)
The island goes under to the sea in the concatenation of
genres or what Lyotard terms the 'deliberative'. In fact, this
incomplete dialectics of the deliberative lacks a concept of the
Good, the True, or the Law ('The law', he writes in The Differend,
(is not deduced'). Where would we go for an immanentTruth? -
Terror. That would be the truth of the final word. To have
determined the touch of law as an object would require that the
rule of its signification have been made present. On the other
hand, reflective judgement lacks this rule, and it is this in Kant
which Lyotard traces so extraordinarily in the aesthetic. Lacking
either a rule, a concept, or a form, reflective judgement marks
the crisis ofa judgement which, moreover, can not even properly
be designated as cognitive.
Law, in this case, will have been touched in the exposure
ofits relatio~ to itsinsensible and unrepresentable) form - justice.
It is this unprecedented touch, after all, which is indicated (no,
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not identified) in the sensible or affect of the aesthetical, and
which precedes the law:
To be, aesthetically (in the sense of Kant's First Critique), is to
be·there, here and now, exposed in space-time, and to the space-
time ofsomething that touches me before any concept or even
any representation. This before is not known, obviously, because
it is there before we are. It is something like birth and infancy
(Latin, in-fans) - there before we are. The there in question is
called the body. It is not "1" who am born, who is given birth
to. 'T' will be born afterwards, with language...When the law
comes to me, with the ego and language, it is too late. Things
will have already taken a twn. And the turn of law will not
manage to efface the first turn, this first touch. Aesthetics has to
do with this first touch: the one that touched me when I was
not there [PrescrtjJtionj.
The touch touches me before me. It converts me towards
the direction of the touch only just, but also exactly, toutjuste. I
will never have touched this touch. This one who touches us,
and who is in a sense incommunicable. And yet this touch is
something that affects us, an incalculable experience without a
concept, and hence a discontinuous experience. To speak ofwhat
touches us is to speak ofwhat is given over an interval, and even
the sublime of ungraspable. Touch overreaches itself, it will never
have touched this touch and determined or understood it. In a
way, touch converts me at my limitj such that we may say that
men and women are linked - by turning. (Does the touch go to
its distance? Here, in an invisible interiority which is not a simple
nihilation, but the deferment of the touch, and even a touching
of touch. There, in the body where light encounters its internal
limit, another place. Man is the refuge of the invisible. All the
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destitute, imaginable, nonreal things are sheltered there. What if
we were the site of this conversion?)
*... this touch ofdeath (le mort) that touches on the soul,
and heart and mind (l'ame) '" this touch of love (lamour), and
the touch of love on the point of which one dies ... there (La)
where she (la) ...
+How, then, to touch on the distance of this name? It is
just to remember this one, Jean-Frans:ois Lyotard, who never
departed from the disorientation of the just, from all its names
and phrases, its differends and seas ('Let us bear witness to the
unpresentable, let us activate the diffirends and save the honour
of the name) ['Answering the Question: "What is
Postmodernism?"r.) It will be to love the 'love of occurrence ...
that designated what is at stake in the genre itself. To love what
happens as ifit were a gift, to love even the Is it happening? [The
DiffirendJ. What is this love that happens and renders us
insensible, and that is just to come? Unpresentable and
unrepresentable, without form, this love ofjustice is an insensible
touch which reaches out to its limit, its borders, the literal of
what is said as it passes between the littoral ofincalculable islands,
and which touches on these borders in its abandonment. This,
too then, would indicate the significance ofthe critical character
of this irrecuperable limit, one which is given in the agitation of
the sea (the sea, as judging, is an heterogeneous milieu, one that
is preceded by the unpresentable law ofjustice), the name Lyotard
gives to the faculty of judging whose passage, indeed as passage,
figures the relata without a preceding or determinant rule. Justice,
in this sense, and judgement, is unprecedented. Judging is not a
place, it is a passage. It is not insensible (do not forget thatpassage
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names in French the fleeting immediacy of the Impressionist's
brush-stroke, and which Lyotard refers to as a kind ofanamnesis),
but it is not a place, it is not strictly a site. So that we can say, too,
that the problem is not that we can have no idea of justice, but
only that we can have an idea of justice. We can not not have
justice, and this is our problem, our good problem if you will
(this, in effect, marks the passage between the incommensurable
and the cognitive, the just and the apophantic, and the will and
obligation: lThis passage from one to the other is, properly
speaking, unintelligible. There is a resistance, an
incommensurability ... the request that is made of me by the
other ... is a request that can never be fulfilled' Uust Gaming]).
The (non)site ofjudging and justice is the turn ofsite, a singular
site which takes place in an orientation towards the lack of its
rule. Hence, while there can be an ethics for the site or the island,
there is no proper ethics for the site of judging, except as this
crisis ofjudging towards its necessity. In this sense, then, there is
no ethics outside the impossible of the site.
This, too, would name the inhuman region Lyotard
indicates in the alterity to the self-same identical, this emergency
of the non-identical other that makes possible the emergency of
judging, justice, and rights. It is an emergency, too, that is a
silence and an amnesty:
If we do not preserve this inhuman region where we can
encounter ... that which completely escapes the exercise ofrights,
we d.o not deserve the rights granted to us. What use is the right
to freedom ofexpression ifwe have nothing to say but what has
already been said? And how can we have any chance offinding
a way to say what we don't know how to say if we don't pay
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attention to the silence ofthe other inside us? This silence stands
as an exception to the reciprocity that characterises rights, but it
is its legitimation ... it is what provides the right to have rights.
Yet since it has nothing to do with rights, it win always have to
make do with an amnesty [<The General Linej.
This place that is not a place and not a lack of place, this
justice and judging, has no name. It is unknown, unbekan~t,
inconnu. It is a word for a name that does not exist. It is the
name for a country that does not know how to forget, the home
of the dead. Here went so many beloveds, blesse/es, the blessed
and the wounded, to a region I cannot name. Here the named
one goes with all the unknown names into memor}', which here
occupied by these singular names releases memory to the necessity
of its act.
(Beloved, your approach turns me in an other direction.
Incompossible immanence.)
* The 'past that is not past': the spectre that does not
haunt the present, that cannot be internalised by way of an
Erinnerung, but which is felt and indicated as an absence without
form [Heidegger and thejews], and whose n.ame is unsurpassable.
Which is not, before all else, to forego the reality of the referent
but to attend to it critically, and hence in the haunt of the present
that is produced by diffiree, where 'to fight against forgetting
means to fight to remember that one forgets as soon as one
believes, draws conclusions, and holds for certain '" to fight
against forgetting the precariousness ofwhat has been established,
ofthe reestablished past; it is a fight for the sickness whose recovery
is simulated' [Heidegger and ~he jews]. And the present: will it,
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then, not be exceeded by this contamination? Will the present
mark an immanence ofcontamination, its haunt, the real of the
excess, this place where the haunt, exceeding its excess, becomes
structurally different to itself, and becomes real? Will it not then
be the case that the present is the site ofan immemorial? Isn't the
failure of memory here, now, in the present? For in what sense
would we speak ofa memory ofthe past in the past? To remember
Lyotard, then, in the present, will this not be to remember the
immemorial of the past?
This is not to exclude an attention to the work, and to the
work written in his name, but it is also to remember that,
somehow, this absence is not cognitive but is felt. He takes place
from the other side ofhis presence. But to write ofhim, will this
not too be to have entered into the death ofa representation that
can never be presented? Will writing, too, of the immemorial,
not be a staging of its oblivion, and a kind ofamnesty? (Nothing
has been written of this uncanny absence. Writing, presenting
itself in its absence, can no longer give the proper of his name.
One writes, concerning the extraordinary work of]ean-Franc;ois
Lyotard, according to an inconceivable fault). That there is
something lacking, yes, this is sure. But this failure of the name
to name its proper is the lack in which writing takes place (recall
his quasi-prescription in the letter to David Rogozinski: 'Writing
must perform on itself-in its detail, in the restlessness ofwords
that appear or fail to appear, in its receptivity to the contingency
of the word - the very work of exploring its own weakness and
energy'; or again from The Inhuman: 'Perhaps words themselves,
in the most secret place of thought, are its matter, its timbre, its
nuance, ie. what it cannot manage to think'). Writing, then, not
simply as the failure ofmemory, and with it a whole tradition of
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Platonic mnemonics, but as the memory of a singular failure
Here, then, a name in this fault, one that presents itselfwithoul
our recognition, addressing us from our inconceivable:
dispossession, and hence too drawn in the address of an
obligation, a drawing away (ob) and a binding (ligare). It is the
taking place of taking place. It is a crisis ... unnameable, the
dispossession of language - as if writing were the trace of an
irreducible fault (one whose proper name would coincide with
the most unnameable naming).
:1= How to read Lyotard? His thought makes a child of us.
A writing and love which testifies to an unnameable singularit)T.
Read his letter to David Rogozinski on the aporia ofwriting, on
this writing ofLyotard's which performs its surrender to language
on itself:
In each case, we are concerned with an idiom, an absolutely
singular, untranslatable way ofdeciphering what is happening.
The point ofview, the point oflistening, oftouch, ofscent, any
point at which the sensible assaults me is not transferable in
space-time. We call this singularity of resonance "existence"....
MJur point oflistening, ofcontact, etc, will never be mine. The
blinding enigma of the world of existences is that in it
singularities are present in the plural: they constantly come into
contact with one another .... And, in this contact, love is the
exception. It demands the permeability and the surrender of
my field ofperspective to yours. Hence the never-ending search
for a different idiom ofsensibility, this vertigo where my idiom
and yours falter..
This is why I feel we must extend the line of the body in
the line ofwriting. The labour ofwriting is allied to the work of
love; but it inscribes the trace ofthe initiatory event in language
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and thus offers to share it.... What I want to say to you is simply
this: following this line does not mean shutting ourselves away
in ivory towers or turning our backs on the new forms of
expression bestowed on us by cont~mporary science and
technology. It means that we use these forms in an attempt to
bear witness to what really matters: the childhood of an
encounter, the welcome extended to the marvel that (something)
is happening, the respect for the event. Don't forget, you were
a~d are this yourself: the welcomed marvel, the respected event.
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